Quick update of WDFC, doubt I do this often, but they reported so soon after I wrote on it I thought I’d give some thoughts. We’re seeing the green shoots of recovery on margins, but EMEA was weak, much more than expected. All in all, nothing changed in my thesis, but I’ll expand.
Maintenance sales (their core product) declined about 30% in EMEA. That’s stark for a business that was resilient in 2008. It would have been just 15% FX-neutral and they did exit some Russian and Belarus business, but still. It was only down 1% in the Q ended Aug. They sell through distributors in the EU, so no surprise in the face of uncertainty, distributors are destocking.
As such, EBITDA missed my estimate by about $5MM ($23MM vs. $28MM) solely due to this. GMs even beat my estimate by about 50bps. And mgmt basically said they have no change to their expectations, which is a second-half story. Normally I take the under on any second-half story, but this one makes complete sense.
I reviewed the “cost of a can” to see what is really driving the margin erosion. Basically 65% of a WD-40 can is either related to oil or tin. While packaging doubled in $s, the real needle movers are the chemical inputs, can, and manufacturing fees. These manufacturing fees are essentially warehousing and freight costs.
I think all of these will be tailwinds in second half.
Plus, China sales grew 22% on the maintenance side and 32.5% in APAC-ex China. So that is a good sign and probably more room to run as China re-opens.
Outside of that, last thing I’ll highlight is they have way too much inventory. They should destock themselves. But anyway, I expect that’ll be a 2H cash source. Could be up to $85MM, honestly. That may seem small, but it ain’t nothing for a company I expect to recover to $120MM+ EBITDA plus have a cash release like that.
I wrote up WDFC stock in 2021. The inspiration was wanting to know why TF WDFC stock always traded at such a rich multiple. Persistantly. It would not have been a good short leading up to that time. Is everyone who hates it missing something in the numbers? At the time WDFC stock was trading around $300/share at 35x LTM EBITDA and 52x LTM EPS. Now it is more like $165, so if you could’ve top ticked it, good for you.
It was a good exercise. It’s easy to discard a stock simply by looking at the multiple and saying “nope too high”, when I think we can all agree we’ve bought companies with low P/E multiples and really regretted it, too.
Anyway, my conclusion was it was a really good brand, great business with super high ROIC, long-growth runway that required little capital. Pristine balance sheet… too pristine if you ask me….
Plus, its been highlighted before, that WDFC stock has some particular things going for it.
Setting all that aside, I couldn’t make the numbers work to meet my return threshold. In other words, a business can have a high return on its capital, but if I pay too much for that invested capital, my return will suck. the company has some long-term targets I thought they had really low chance of hitting based on their trajectory. I still think that’s the case, but the company has started to talk those down.
So it wasn’t a good time to buy. But I also pointed out WDFC stock never looked great to buy, but somehow you could’ve earned a >10% return buying at many points in the past when it looked expensive.
I’ll re-post that chart here – red line is where you could buy it 3 years before the current date, dotted orange is where it needed to be for 10% CAGR. Blue line is where it was. In other words, you could buy it below that price much of the time and it ended up being much higher in the end.
Now with the stock at ~$165, I think it is actually an OK time to buy. I won’t rehash everything I did in the first post. This time it comes down to a 3 basic ideas:
Earnings are depressed from a price / raw material mismatch (this is true for many specialty chemical companies, such as Sherwin-Williams, PPG, etc). Price is flowing through now at the same time raw materials are collapsing. Earnings estimates look too low, in my opinion.
China is a growth story LT. It is still a small segment. Re-opening will help drive higher growth perhaps faster than people expect.
Last but not least, it is a great business and you have to pay up for quality. I’ve quibbled with execution in the past, but it does have a long growth trajectory (how is China only $20MM of revenue??).
I’m not sure what is exactly in WD-40, but I know it is a lot of oil derivatives.
Here is how true specialty chemicals typically work (and footnote- this is kinda what caused Sherwin Williams to re-rate, among other things).
They are typically resilient businesses with pricing power and their customer doesn’t keep track of their raw materials and keep an index of inputs to change price (i.e. not a commodity)
In an benign environment, should grow volumes GDP+ and get price too
However, if oil spikes, there can be a mismatch in raws and price, compressing margins
BUT what specialty chem players do is they get MORE price to cover raws and when they fall again, they never lower price.
So what happens? True specialty chemical players may realize some compressed margins short-term in an oil spike, but long-term they reset higher.
You can kind of see that play out for WDFC gross margins over time. It tends to move inverse with oil, but then reset higher:
In their fiscal year 2022 (ended August) they realized nearly 500bps of gross margin compression. Their long-term target is >55% gross margins, and they did 49% in ’22 when they had just done 54% in ’21. They break down more of the headwinds here, but keep in mind each of these have turned to tailwinds now and the company likely won’t be lowering price.
They go on to say they have implemented significant price increases that will recover margins over time. And yet, when you look at street expectations, they don’t have them getting back to slightly-below 54% gross margins until 2024. To be fair, 2023 guidance from management is wide – anywhere from 51%-53%.
The low end doesn’t seem right to me and is meaningfully different outcome. The low end doesn’t seem right based on their comment that a ~25% price increased went into effect late-2022. They also already had some margin benefits from price coming through, though they were masked.
They also say they will be implementing these across geographies.
So you’ve got all this price coming through, right when raw materials are falling. Sure, we may be in a recession in 2023, but that’s a big maybe too. I’m at ~$6.85 of EPS and the company guided to $5.15 for 2023… I only model 5% volume growth (big price increases result in some elasticity plus weaker market).
Again, history shows they regain this margin and then some…
Moving on to keep this short.
The other thing about this company is China. APAC in total for WDFC is <$75MM. I don’t see why this geography couldn’t be well above $200MM (Europe and North America are $200MM and $240MM).
There’s a lot of squeaky, rusty stuff in Asia too.
So I can’t say when, but that seems inevitable if they can get the branding and distribution right. Which they clearly haven’t so far.
But the CEO who had been there for forever just retired. They brought up an insider so not totally optimistic, but at least you know things won’t be shooken up too much.
In sum, I think at we’re at a much more reasonable point optically on valuation (24x my 2023 EPS), but again EPS doesn’t matter. What does matter is FCF per share is likely going to go grow double-digits for essentially a consumer staple where estimates are too low and the required capital to grow is very limited.
That seems like the set-up for a winner. I fully accept being “early” on this one.
It’s a start of the new year, and the end of a year where the S&P500 was down nearly 20%. Some may focus on what worked, I’ll look at an idea that did not go well. Big Lots stock, down 68% in 2022, it’s market cap is just ~$425MM.
I think there’s still room for optimism (even if its just a “dogs of the Dow” type of viewpoint). This bagholder just won’t quit. Mainly because I think the stock is trading at ~3x FY’24 EBITDA, 8% dividend yield, with some upside if they continue to sell some assets.
Don’t get me wrong. Don’t take this as “Big Lots stock is my largest position.” Far, far from it. Could we go into a recession? Sure. Am I happy that FCF may be mediocre despite the low EBITDA multiple? Of course not. That’s why position sizing is important.
That said, from here the stock looks interesting (even if that means when I first wrote it up was much too high). This could be one to add to the radar at the very least. I’m also looking out to 2024. So if you’re someone who is looking for something that will definitely do well this year, not sure this is the place. Especially because if under this new lens it just looks “interesting”, then it probably has a bit more downside before the upside arrives (just my experience).
I think my biggest mistakes in 2022 were buying low-quality business that seemed like they had tailwinds. Things can quickly change, tailwinds can evaporate, and you’re left with a low-quality business! It worked for awhile and then it really did not work…
Retail is a tough business. That’s apparent right now where many are caught with too much inventory (in the face of destocking), mark downs are evaporating profits and working capital has eaten liquidity. Freight and labor have also been challenging.
What makes this a particularly bad pick for me is I’ve been calling for the bull whip to play out for some time now and this is a clear example (here and here).
But I really liked what Big Lots was doing – pivoting store formats, bought brands with staying power (Broyhill), improving cost structure and growing stores to help absorb fixed cost leverage. I still think all of those are true. But as I’ll show below, they really got hit with freight, promotional activity, and labor costs.
Theoretically, the challenges mentioned above should be “one time” in nature, or at least cyclical problems, not secular. And they are all known now, at least I think they are…
I built a waterfall chart from 2019 to show the pressures Big Lots has seen. But just to rehash in FY2022 (which will end Jan’23, so Q4 is still an estimate).
Sales will have declined ~11%
GMs down >400bps
Opex up as a % of sales >350bps
Big Lots ended 2019 with ~6.5% EBITDA margins, so no surprise it is now negative.
But when you break down the reasons, Big Lots has called out freight being 400-500bps of operating margin pressure via GM and Opex. And they said that has peaked at this point. Promotional activity has peaked, too.
Looking forward, Big Lots has already faced destocking as mentioned. If we assume modest sales growth to 2024 and some of these headwinds abating, I could see Big Lots easily getting back to $255MM of EBITDA in FY’24 with some reasonable assumptions.
With a ~$425MM market cap and ~$825MM Enterprise Value, that means Big Lots stock is trading at 3.2x EBITDA!
Is it the cheapest retailer I have ever seen? No. But I think that multiple could look even lower given more asset sales are on the come:
I have no idea what these assets could sell for. Back in 2020, they did a sale leaseback of 4 distribution centers for a gross amount of $725MM (net proceeds was more like $575mm after taxes and such). That’s not really a comp, but was interesting how low book value was compared to the actual proceeds (recorded a $463MM gain on sale).
I did find several listings of Big Lots stores that ranged anywhere from $2.5-$4.5MM (honestly averages in the middle). If it could sell 25 stores for $2MM a piece, that is $50MM gross. There’d probably be $3.5MM of incremental rent expense as a result, but that’d still be a win in my book given where the market cap is.
Big Lots has nearly $720MM of PP&E on its balance sheet. Selling assets at better than a 10% cap rate is accretive given Big Lots stock is trading at such a low multiple. It helps liquidity and can help pay down debt. I’ll take it.
While dangerous to anchor on, let’s not forget book value is $27/share.
As I mentioned at the top, a big concern here is $255MM of EBITDA may not generate much FCF. They’ll probably spend $170MM on capex per year (albeit to grow stores). I think with interest the stock is probably trading at a 10% FCF yield at best.
So one to watch. I still think this business and brand are underappreciated long-term. But alas, buying low-quality businesses even at cheap prices can be a dangerous game.
Quick idea today: I am looking at Service Properties Trust (SVC). I think the idea is interesting and there is a catalyst. Here’s the situation:
Company Overview: SVC is an externally managed REIT (managed by RMR – more on this later), owning 304 hotels and nearly 800 “service-oriented properties” which are net lease
Glance at the Opportunity:
$1.4BN market cap, $913MM in cash*, $7.14BN in Debt = $7.7BN EV
Tangible book $10.62 vs. stock at $8.61 = 19% discount to book value
Book value likely underestimates the net lease portfolio value
Book value is also depreciated – i.e. the assets bought many years ago likely didn’t go down in price from the price paid, but accounting is accounting. Depreciation is $3.5BN of value – think about that in the context of the market cap.
See Value Build table below. You could arrive at $40 implied stock price depending on what you want to believe. I used 7% cap rate for the net lease portfolio which is a decent discount to a recent comp.
You can also get to ~$12 stock using 12x EBITDA, which is 37% upside, and ignores a lot of other things I’ll mention. True value likely is somewhere in between these data points.
The cap structure is overlevered, they have a $500MM of bonds due Aug 2022 and the $1BN revolver is technically due as well.
*They have $1BN drawn on revolver. The rest of the debt is unsecured bonds.
The revolver draw isn’t all bad – they transitioned ~200 hotels to Sonesta in 2020/2021 and thought it had a chance of being disruptive, so they did it out of abundance of caution. It *was* disruptive when you add in COVID lock-downs, but both are looking like they are in the rear view mirror.
In some ways, this reminds me of CPLG, but sketchier – CPLG owned hotels and leverage got a bit too high. But CPLG sold poor-quality hotels at amazing levels, delevered and create value. Eventually they sold the whole business.
Bottom line: Given this is a levered equity, if you think the enterprise value is too low, that likely means the equity stub could have A LOT of upside. But also means A LOT of risk!
The Assets – Hotels and Service Properties:
The hotels are managed or operated by franchisees of Sonesta (261 hotels), Hyatt (17 hotels) or Marriott (16 hotels), etc.
About half of these are extended stay hotels, with the other being a mix of mid-level to some luxury. But luxury is in the eye of the hotel-er.
The hotels are recovering from COVID nicely, but no where near peak. The company did provide monthly operating stats in their deck which is nice.
The largest tenant in the net lease portfolio is TravelCenter of America (45% of minimum rent owed, but larger on a $ value basis – likely 60%)
TravelCenter is public (ticker: TA) and is a full-service truck stop.
TA is doing quite well fundamentally. Looks like EBITDA has doubled LTM 9/30/21 vs. 2018. Haven’t fully dug in, but seems like if trucking in America is doing well, TA is doing well.
Other tenants in the net lease portfolio include Shopping Centers (20%) AMC (2%), The Great Escape (2%), Life Time Fitness (~2%), and a tail of others. You can imagine many of these were battered by COVID, but mattered less compared to TA and Shopping Centers.
Either way, the company is collecting 100% of rents now and the portfolio is 98% occupied with well staggered maturities. I encourage you to check out the investor deck for more.
What else makes this interesting?
The situation is hairy: RMR involvement (I’ll get to it) and a levered equity. The latter tends to produce high returns if you get the entry point right and you think the B/S is fixable
Abandoned REIT: SVC had to cut its dividend during COVID. Went from 54 cents to a penny.
Catalyst: Currently marketing 68 hotels for sale ($579MM of carrying value). Mgmt stated they expect to get at least carrying value in Q1’22.
Mgmt said they have term sheets on all properties, though one is a bit more complicated. I suspect we will see staggered announcements to multiple buyers
Sales proceeds will first go to refi the bonds and likely downsize and extend the revolver
These assets for sale lag the rest of the portfolio in earnings or had deferred capex (read: bottom tier). It also reduces hotels vs. net lease portfolio. Net / net RemainCo should be valued higher.
Selling these assets and taking out the impending maturity can act as a cleansing event for investors to come back to the stock
Taking SVC’s annualized net lease rents of $396, 6% cap rate = $6.6BN. That’s 86% of the EV right there. 7% cap = ~75% of EV.
SVC owns 8% of TA equity and 34% of Sonesta Holdco. The former is worth about $51MM, the latter I am not sure as they are not public.
RMR earns fee on managing Sonesta. We can infer Sonesta makes about $750MM in revenue (0.6% fee on all revenue per RMR 10k)
We just saw CPLG get acquired for 2.8x revenue, which would imply $2.1BN EV here.
Assume 60% debt / cap (total guess) = $1.26BN of debt and $840MM of equity, implies about $285MM of value for SVC. This is all a wet finger in the air and the carrying value of the investment is $62MM. I use carrying value.
Here is the value build of what I have so far
There’s only one thing I haven’t talked about so far and that is the remaining 236 hotels.
The table below is how I got that number and it goes back to that depreciated book value discussion.
SVC’s lodging-REIT roots trace back to 1995. It isn’t out of the realm of possibility that many of those assets are depreciated considerably.
RMR / Intercompany Relationships:
RMR manages SVC. SVC owns a lot of Sonesta hotels and owns 34% of Sonesta. SVC owns a lot of TA properties and owns 8% of TA. RMR provides management services for Sonesta and TA!
Let me be clearer: RMR manages both sides.
I should also mention people have a lot of misgivings about RMR and the Portnoy’s who manage it.
Let me copy the statement straight from RMR’s 10-k:
Perhaps you can see the risk here. RMR might try to rob Peter to pay Paul. RMR makes more money from managing SVC than it does from Sonesta (like… a lot more. 10x more. $45MM vs. $4-5MM).
That said, the web of inter-ownership perversely provides some comfort (admittedly not a ton). Screwing part of the chain should ripple back through and solve nothing. And again, RMR makes more from SVC. If there is a transaction, it is to preserve value at SVC.
On the other hand, I will admit an outright sale of SVC isn’t likely. I doubt RMR does that.
Are there any signal of what RMR could do?
RMR also manages Diversified Healthcare Trust (DHC) which had some liquidity and covenant issues
RMR went out and found institutional investors for some assets, from my understanding not all core, which DHC contributed to a JV.
It allowed DHC to get some liquidity, get a real bid on the assets, but not lose all economics
Why does this matter?
I think if your one hang-up is leverage, I think there are many solutions in addition to selling these non-core hotels in Q1.
If your one hang-up is RMR, then I think they’ve shown they are acting in the best interest of the company. RMR is aligned as they earn management fees on the enterprise values of the companies. They also manage the JVs in DHC’s case (lol)
Did RMR tip there hand to this??
That’s all for now – stay tuned for the asset sale announcements!
Vimeo stock collapsed following the spin from IAC. That caught my attention, I read some of their calls, but I never really dug in. Then, in early January, I tweeted there was an interesting cash-covered put trade you could do at $12.50 strike. As Vimeo stock has fallen more, I decided to do some “napkin” math on the stock.
Say Vimeo grows half the rate of management’s target, FCF margins end at 20%, and priced at 20x FCF. Discount that back at 10% and you get a market cap that isn’t too far off from today. These are all “finger in the air” numbers, but it showed me I should do more work.
If I had one takeaway from reviewing the company is that each Vimeo subscriber is not created equally! And when you break down the math, the targets become much more believable. If you want to cut to the chase, I’d suggest reading the “All Customers are Not Created Equal” section below as well as the model cut outs I have.
Is there risk? Of course. But I think many are likely saying, “eh, I’ll just wait” right now and that’s big time group think.
But first, I’ll go through a quick background, why the stock has gotten pummeled, and what you need to believe to make money from here. I’ve included a few screen shots of two of my models to emphasize this point.
Vimeo was spun out of IAC in May 2021. The spin followed strong 2020 results as Vimeo enabled many businesses to operate during the pandemic. No doubt, Barry Diller & Joey Levin at IAC recognized tech / SaaS multiples were high and a partial sale + spin would be best for shareholders.
Indeed, IAC sold a partial stake in Vimeo for $150MM which valued the company at $2.75BN in November 2020. Then in January 2021, another $300MM of equity was sold valuing Vimeo between $5.2BN – $5.7BN. In the first case, the valuation was a touch under 10x ’20 sales and then quickly moved to about 20x sales.
Today, we’re looking at Vimeo with a market cap of $2.3BN, or 6x ’21 sales (5x if you exclude cash, as Vimeo is FCF+, albeit from SBC & deferred revenue). Spun out at $57, the stock can now be purchased for under $14.
Ok with that background of “why Vimeo is even public” out of the way, we can explore why the stock is getting hammered, and then we can address why it’s a reasonable buy.
Why did Vimeo stock get pummeled?
Vimeo’s stock has gotten smoked for a variety of reasons.
Pandemic-enabled companies are coming home to roost (Peloton, Zoom, Docusign, Moderna are all down >50%)
Joey Levin straight up said it was expensive!
Growth is decelerating
Lost credibility: Vimeo will likely miss targets in its first year following an investor day that promised 30% growth for next 5 years
They are changing price strategy starting in ’22. A foundational change can lead to volatility
Spin dynamics, possibly
Investors are less enamored with tech / SaaS
I won’t go into all of these, but I think the first few are worth going through.
Pandemic-enabled and “a bit rich” at the spin:
In IAC’s Q3’20 letter, Levin stated that Vimeo was “a business that benefited meaningfully from the pandemic.” They also said, “we can’t be certain that the magnitude of the positive lift to Vimeo will persist when the virus’ effect on our lives becomes less pronounced…“
They went on to say, “Vimeo’s access to capital inside of IAC will be much more expensive than access to capital outside of IAC.” They decided to test the market by selling some shares (Nov ’20) and then some more (Jan ’21). They noted how the investors were willing to pay on a P/S multiple, almost besmirching the reputation of the buyers!
Read between the lines. They were saying others are willing to pay much more for Vimeo than we are.
Growth deceleration + Lost credibility
In that same IAC letter, they called out acceleration during the pandemic which was obvious.
Prior to the pandemic, we were steadily proving Vimeo’s fit in the market. Organic bookings growth consistently accelerated last year from 11% in Q1’19 to 27% in Q4’19 as we began to expand from our filmmaker roots to a broader audience of small businesses and large enterprises. Then the pandemic hit, and that acceleration exploded to 41% in Q1, 79% in Q2, and 56% in the most recent quarter.
If we look at the latest monthly metrics, we can see Vimeo is growing strongly, but at a slower pace. They actually face the worst comps in Q1’22 so it is likely this decelerates even more.
Total revenue is coming down from high-50s to 60% to 40s, high-twenties and now around 23% in December. Look at Q1’21 figures and we can probably conclude comps will be tough. Perhaps the company grows “just” high-teens / low twenties.
This is problematic as management set out much more lofty 5 year goals at their investor day in March 2021. A few quarters in and it looks like we will be under the goal.
Vimeo hasn’t reported Q4 yet, but investors can look at the reported monthly metrics as a guide. Even before they reported December metrics, they were guiding investors down at conferences:
[Regarding Q4]. What we have said is that revenue growth to be about 25% year-over-year. And if you think about that, we are lapping a very strong growth rate in the fourth quarter of last year, which was about 54%. So on a 2-year stack basis, we are significantly higher even compared to Q3 of this year. We haven’t talked specifically about 2022 and what the growth rates would be there. We are still in the planning process and for all the reasons that you talked about, the visibility being harder. We’ll provide more guidance as we get through this year and into early next year.
But what we have said is that the 30% growth rate is unlikely next year. And we also believe the first half of next year and the growth rates will be muted for the same comp reasons that we talked about earlier, and we expect the growth rate to be accelerated in the second half of the year. So if you think about our growth rates coming down in the second half of this year, that would continue through the first half and then we expect it to reaccelerate sometime in the second half of the year.
My emphasis added.
But let me say one heuristic I have learned over time.Anytime a company says that “we’ll make it up in the second half”, it is a SHORT for me.
“But Dilly D – if that is the case, how can you possibly buy the stock now?”
I think a lot is priced in at this point (also dangerous words as making it up in the second half). But after studying the business model, strategy, and thinking about the TAM, I do think this business can continue to grow at high rates.
Ok enough depressing talk, let’s talk about why Vimeo now looks cheap!
Why Does Vimeo Stock Look Cheap?
Vimeo is a more focused company, post-spin. They are free to operate the way they want & invest where they want. Focus on a singular goal is important.
End of the day, Vimeo is a good business
Classic “freemium” model converts users to paid in highly efficient manner. That said, enterprise customers (where decent amount of S&M is dedicated) are worth way more than typical “Pro” subscriber.
Enterprise 1% of subscribers, but 25% of revenue.
50% of paid customers started off with the free plan (i.e. freemium model)
Vimeo is an alternative to YouTube for business
Pandemic likely pulled forward sales, but also accelerated market growth and adoption.
Decent amount of growth is “locked in”
I’d gamble some things from the pandemic will stay (e.g. virtual “town halls” for companies, more video options for live events, etc.)
Brand value is worth something (I won’t dive in here, but something to think about)
The “What do I need to believe?” case seems reasonable
First, I think a focused, small company can really do wonders. Investors worry big tech will squash the “little guy.” See online dating, industrial distribution, media content, marketplaces, among many others. But Vimeo lives and dies by this “niche.” They come into the office everyday thinking about this one thing.
Steve Jobs said with “focus and simplicity you can move mountains.” To me: stand alone company = more focus, though maybe Vimeo requires more investment short-term.
I think we started the year with about 75 quota-carrying sales headcount, and we would end the year at about 150, so almost doubling. We have opened offices, at least in 4 or 5 new geographies that we didn’t have at the beginning of this year, so significant expansion
Seems like they are investing for growth.
End of Day, Vimeo is a good business
On the Self-Serve segment of our revenue (meaning, a customer begins to pay Vimeo without having spoken to a salesperson), we’re seeing about $5 in profit for every $1 we spend in marketing. That ratio has continued to steadily improve and we haven’t yet found the limit on our ability to spend on marketing with those returns
IAC also mentioned during the pandemic that Vimeo “accidentally” went EBITDA positive as the growth resulted in a lot of operating leverage.
Go back to the 2020 summary results with long-term goals below. Look at that operating leverage on the gross margin line and EBITDA. Pretty impeccable. This has been true over time when you spread the financials as well and look back to 2018 and 2019. I do think a SaaS company like Vimeo should be able to reach 20%+ EBITDA margins, which we can get into in the model later.
All Customers are Not Created Equal
As mentioned, Enterprise is just 1% of subscribers, but 25% of revenue. This checks out with their other disclosures:
As of December 31, 2020, we had over 3,800 enterprise customers, who, as of the quarter ended December 31, 2020, pay us over $22,000 per year, on average. We define “enterprise customers” as those who purchase plans through contact with our sales force. Our enterprise customers grew 87% year-over-year for the quarter ended December 31, 2020, and these customers now represent nearly 25% of our total revenue for the same period.
The goal is to increase Enterprise exposure. In fact, as of Q3’21, it was 30% of revenue.
I created a hypothetical scenario where Vimeo had 100 paid customers, 99 on a “Plus, Pro, or Premium” contract and 1 enterprise customer. Let’s assume nothing changes other than their ability to gain one more enterprise customers. Note, I somewhat made up numbers to back into an ARPU roughly around today’s levels.
The other subs can be flat, ARPU can be flat, but the mix effectcan drive significant results.
And assuming ARPU is flat is pretty conservative. They stated in their S-1 that Net Revenue Retention was 110% and in Q3’21 they stated:
“Our enterprise net revenue retention remains healthy with our sixth consecutive quarter of NRR above 100%.”
Pricing Strategy Change
Let me also say they are changing their pricing strategy. As I said, foundational changes can cause a lot of turmoil. Currently, this is in “beta” but they are moving from a storage-based model to a “per seat” model. In other words, they are going to try to base payment tiers off of customer success. You host a webinar, Vimeo will charge off of registrants. If you have an internal library of content, it will be based off of admin seats.
This may turn off some people. But Vimeo is doing it now because they feel they’ve expanded the product platform enough to make it enticing. Plus, aligned payoffs makes a lot of sense. Think about Facebook ads where the company buying the ad only pays when someone clicks – that is high ROI and easy to tie which increases lock in.
This is no doubt a big project and scary, but they have been talking about it for at least a year. If it works, they’ll move customers up in pricing tiers (e.g. from the self-serve model to a higher tier). For what it is worth, most SaaS companies are on a per seat model.
Here is Vimeo talking about converting customers and retaining them, as well as bringing up per-seat pricing. This is from March-21, but they also spoke about this in 2020.
In terms of the conversion and upgrade mechanisms, so I think of it in two ways. One of the biggest features that we see help unlock our free users to convert in the first place is being able to create content. The creation of content is a big barrier. So things like our Create app or Vimeo Create app, being able to record your screen and send a video message, those actions are really the things that we found activate a free user to get them to be paid.
From there, the way we tend to move our users and subscribers up tiers is unlocking more advanced functionality. Some examples would be livestreaming, advanced marketing tools, the ability to capture e-mails within a player, put your customization and branding, add calls to action, privately and securely share content or create a video portal, those are all the mechanisms today. Tomorrow, we see even more mechanisms. You’ll see us do things as we expand our product suite. You’ll see us look at per-seat pricing, for example, so that we can actually use the number of seats or the size of your team as a way to move people up tiers. But even what we have today, we see, I think, about 25% of our self-serve subscribers move up tiers from those other features I just mentioned.
Vimeo has >200 million free users today and they have a good history of converting them to paid. I think about Dropbox: it is much easier said than done converting free users, but when you are actually able to bring them up the chain, it is a beautiful thing.
If you go back to the S-1, it seems like this isn’t a “new” change, but something thought about for awhile now:
Over 65% of our new enterprise contracts came from customers who were existing free users or self-serve subscribers first
We seek to employ a “land and expand” strategy where we inspire our existing subscribers to increase video adoption and usage and upgrade to higher-priced plans over time. For enterprise customers, we seek to expand the number of employees, teams and departments using our platform and increase contract value organization-wide.
What about YouTube?
All of this can be a disconnect for people who quickly think of YouTube as a competitor. I’d say a lot of YouTube is B2C, ad-driven revenue.
Most people today probably still think of us as the sort of indie smaller version of YouTube. And for most of our history, that’s what we were. We were a viewing destination and a place to watch a video, like YouTube.
And 3 years ago, we pivoted away from that strategy to really being a B2B video SaaS company…today, we enable any business of any size to connect with their customers and their employees with video…we do this by providing a very simple, high-quality, end-to-end solution for those businesses and professionals. So SMBs and marketers will use us to make social media videos, post them all over the web and drive traffic back to their business or store. Fitness studios and churches will use us to live stream their classes and their sermons. And yes, we have Fortune 500 companies using us to host virtual town halls and conferences and events
Video is a big market and there are a lot of different use cases (read: niches). To head off the “YouTube vs. Vimeo” argument, let me pause and offer a few reasons why someone would choose Vimeo.
YouTube is quantity over quality: Vimeo can offer higher quality videos with more customization
No ads: there is a component of control here, such as no control over what ad plays in front of your video. Plus, an ad is inherently trying to drive traffic away from the site. That is NOT what a Vimeo customer wants.
Make money with pay per view: Back to that fitness class example, a small business can set up a “pay per view” using Vimeo
Password / privacy protection: Can create company specific vids or those for customers without sharing with the world
It’s reasons like these that the NYSE does live stream of opening and closing bell on Vimeo, or why Starbucks does workforce training on the platform. From a quality perspective, a lot of music videos are now on Vimeo as well as short-films where the filmmakers care about their videos not being compressed.
Anyway, it is a difficult question for many of the 800lbs gorilla squashing Vimeo’s niche, but I go back to how big the video market is. To me, the analogy is similar to an Etsy vs. Amazon – both can exist.
I think this conversation on Vimeo will not die down. It will likely continue to “dog” the company for some time, especially when reports of other video players adding new features (like Zoom) emerge. Unfortunately, I can’t “prove” Vimeo will win in every case. That’s the bet.
Summary Model Scenarios
For the first model summary, I wanted to show a “management case” and have ’22 at subs and ARPU growing 9-10%, for 20% revenue growth, followed by re-acceleration. I assume some modest leverage on COGS, but they are already at their goal, and some fixed cost leverage (mostly coming from G&A – where I assume ~70% of G&A is fixed).
Yes, I do assume SBC is added back to EBITDA for Adj. EBITDA.
I assume, because they’ll be generating so much cash and already have a lot of cash on hand, that they start buybacks in 2023 = FCF. They likely do acquisitions instead, such as the two at the end of 2021, but those assumptions are too hard. Buybacks start at $20/share and stock price increases 15% p.a.
Bottom line: If you think this is reasonable and want to buy the mgmt case, then we are buying the business for 3.7x 2026 EBITDA and the company will be generating a lot of the current market cap in FCF.
In this case, the company will be doing $4.35/share in FCF in 2026 (remember, stock today is <$14). 20x that figure gets you an $87 stock price.
What about the scenario where they were *just* a COVID winner?
I think that’s interesting. The truth might be somewhere in between.
Let’s say subs slow to just 3% a year but ARPU decelerates meaningfully. NOTE: This is in full contrast to the Enterprise customer math we did above! In reality “what I think will happen” is subs could slow, but ARPU accelerates.
But anyway, you can see the results here:
Given I still assume buybacks (at the same prices in the first case) I have Vimeo doing $1.20 in FCF/share by 2026. If you put 20x on that, that’s a $24 stock. That may not seem like much, but that’s 60% over 5 years and foots to a 10% CAGR.
If the truth is somewhere in between, the risk / reward looks pretty attractive now.
I tweeted this in the beginning of the year, because I saw it as an interesting way to play Vimeo and wait for a better price:
Full disclosure, I did do that trade. At the time of writing you can get $2.25 for this contract! That’s an 18% unannualized “yield!” And I also have done that. Worst case, I am buying Vimeo stock at $10.25, or $1.7BN. I am comfortable owning there, too!
Selling cash-covered puts is more conservative than buying the stock. BUT it has less long-term upside. Sentiment seems pretty low, and definitely can get worse, but there is risk you miss out owning a great, little business with a long runway ahead.